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ABSTRACT
Productivity has rebounded in the last decade while manufacturing employment has declined sharply.
The present study uses data on industrial output and employment to examine the sources of these
trends. It finds that the productivity rebound since 1995 has been widespread, with approximately
two-fifths of the productivity rebound occurring in New Economy industries. Moreover, after
suffering a slowdown in the 1970s, productivity growth since 1995 has been at the rapid pace of the
earlier 1948-73 period. Finally, the study investigates the relationship between employment and
productivity growth. If finds that the relevant elasticities indicate that more rapid productivity growth
leads to increased rather than decreased employment in manufacturing. The results here suggest that
productivity is not to be feared  ￿ at least not in manufacturing, where the largest recent employment
declines have occurred. This shows up most sharply for the most recent period, since 1998. Overall,
higher productivity has led to lower prices, expanding demand, and to higher employment, but the
partial effects of rapid domestic productivity growth have been more than offset by more rapid
productivity growth and price declines from foreign competitors.
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  After two decades of dismal performance in the 1970s and 1980s, 
productivity growth rebounded in the late 1990s. It continued to perform at 
extraordinarily high rates in the early 2000s through a stock market bust, a 
recession, an investment decline, rising fiscal deficits, skyrocketing oil prices, 
and interminable small wars.  
 
  The sources of the productivity rebound have been widely studied, and 
most analysts attribute the turnaround to the New Economy – computers, 
semiconductors, software, and telecommunications. What has been the most 
recent experience? Has that fantastic sector continued to be the source of rapid 
growth in the last four years? What has been the impact of rising productivity 
growth on employment? Those are the issue addressed by the present paper. 
 
I. Background and Data 
 
  I first lay out the analytical measures employed in this study along with 
the data used to decompose productivity growth by sector. 
 
  A. Analytical Measures of Productivity Growth 
 
  I begin with a summary of alternative approaches to measuring 
productivity growth. The customary approach to measuring productivity 
growth is (a) the difference of growth rates approach. This defines productivity 
growth as the difference between the growth rate of output and the growth 
rate of inputs. In an earlier paper, I showed that this is not an appropriate 
welfare-theoretic measure of productivity growth.1 I proposed two alternative 
                                              
1 William D. Nordhaus, “Productivity Growth and the New Economy,” Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity, 2001: 2, pp. 211-265. measures: (b) a welfare-theoretic measure, which is defined as the current-
weighted average of productivity growth where the weights are the shares of 
nominal output and (c) a fixed-weight measure, which has the same basic 
construction as the welfare-theoretic measure except that it uses nominal 
output weights of a given period.  
 
  We can summarize these points in terms of a decomposition equation for 
the growth in productivity: 
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where  is the aggregate or total growth of output per unit input,  is the 
growth of output per unit input in industry i,
T
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t i, σ  is the share of industry 
output in total nominal output in period t,  t i, µ  is the share of inputs used in 
industry i of total inputs, and year t = 0 is a base year for calculations. The 
term ) (   0 , , i t i σ σ −  is the difference between the current share and the base-period 
share of nominal output of industry i, while  ) ( t i t i , , µ σ −  is the difference 
between the share of nominal output and of inputs in industry i. The first term 
on the right-hand-side of equation (1) is the fixed-weight measure of 
productivity growth, ; while the sum of the first two terms of 
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  B. Industrial Output Data 
 
  The present study relies on data on the aggregate and by detailed and 
broad industry group. The variables are primarily real and nominal value 
added, and labor inputs measured as hours worked and persons engaged. The 
published data available to decompose productivity by industry has major 
comparability problems. There are four different data sets for industrial output 
available from the Bureau of Economic Analysis: 
 
A.  Industrial output (real value added, nominal value added, and prices) by 1972 
SIC industrial classification using fixed-price weights, available for the 1948-87 
period. 
B.  Industrial output by 1972 SIC code for the period 1977-1987 using chain-
weighted indexes. 
C.  Industrial output by 1987 SIC code for the period 1987-2001 using chain-
weighted indexes. 
D. An entirely different data set using chain-weighted indexes available starting 
in 1998 using the NAICS industrial classification. These data include indexes 
of real value added, prices, along with hours and persons engaged in 
employment. 
 
  Together with Alexandra Miltner, the present author developed an 
integrated data set for all industries for 1948-2001 that integrates the first three 
data sets. This data set was used to analyze the productivity slowdown in a 
companion paper.2  
 
  Unfortunately, there is virtually no overlap among sectors in the old and 
                                              
2 William Nordhaus, with Alexandra Miltner, “A Retrospective on the Postwar Productivity 
Slowdown,” NBER Working Paper No. W10950, December 2004. 
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new classification systems. Moreover, while BEA has shifted from the earlier 
SIC industrial classification to the NAICS system, the industrial data using the 
earlier industrial classification have been discontinued, the NAICS data go 
back only to 1998, and it is virtually impossible for private scholars to map the 
SIC into the NAICS system. 
 
  In order to examine the sources of the labor-productivity rebound, the 
present study uses the methods described in the last section on the Nordhaus-
Miltner data set as well as the new NAICS data set. Even though the data sets 
use different industrial classifications, under ideal conditions they will 
aggregate up to the same aggregate estimate of total productivity growth.3 
 
  A brief word on the use of labor productivity rather than total factor 
productivity. The introduction of capital inputs raises several issues, 
particularly for short periods of time. My earlier productivity paper reviewed 
many of the issues, and these are summarized in the accompanying footnote.4 
 
3 The “ideal conditions” require that price and output indexes are consistent and that there be 
no Fisher aggregation bias. In this study, we rely instead on Törnqvist aggregation, which has 
no aggregation bias. 
 
4 Among the problems which arise, particularly for the 1998-2003 period, are the following: (1) 
Multifactor productivity depends upon estimating rather than measuring the inputs of capital 
services. Estimates of capital services depend upon several critical and questionable 
assumptions (including such things as the existence of perfect rental markets for capital, no 
difference between ex ante and ex post substitutability, no break-in, adjustment, or learning 
costs, perfect competition, and factor rewards proportional to marginal products). These 
assumptions are likely to be stretched particularly then in periods, such as the 1998-2003 period, 
when new technologies with very high rates of depreciation dominate the data on the growth of 
capital services. (2) Measures of capital services generally use a cost of capital formula based on 
interest rates and therefore do not reflect the extraordinary equity valuations in the late 1990s; 
the effect of this is to overestimate the user cost and implicit marginal cost of capital, 
particularly in high-tech industries. (3) Multifactor production functions generally include only 
the return to fixed capital as a non-labor market inputs and exclude the return to other assets 
such as land, inventories, intangible assets such as patents and trademarks, brand value and 
marketing, and subsoil assets such as oil and gas reserves. (4) Inclusion of capital inputs gives 
productivity a pro-cyclical character. For a further discussion, see William D. Nordhaus,   6
                                                                                                                                                 
II. Extent and Sources of the Productivity Rebound 
 
 A.  General  Trends 
 
  It will be useful to begin with a description of the general trends. Figure 1 
shows data on productivity growth for the total economy for the period 1948-
2004. For this calculation, I have used BEA’s estimate of hours worked by full-
time and part-time employees as the input. There are three different output 
concepts, two built up from the industry accounts and one using aggregate 
real GDP from the NIPA accounts. I have taken the three-year moving average 
of the logarithmic growth rate of output per hour to smooth the data. Table 1 
shows the same data grouped by different periods. 
 
  Figure 2 shows the same results using a more restricted output concept, 
“Business output,” which is a BEA-BLS concept used for BLS productivity 
measures. Business excludes government, non-farm housing, as well as not-for 
profit sectors. It is not possible to map the expenditure BEA-BLS concept of 
business output directly into industry measures, but I have made as close an 
approximation as is possible with existing data sources. Table 2 shows the 
same data grouped by periods.  
 
  Finally, it will be useful to provide estimates of the extent of the rebound 
of productivity since the mid-1990s. Figure 3 shows both NIPA and industry 
data for the two concepts grouped into four subperiods.5 For both the total 
 
“Productivity Growth and the New Economy,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2001: 2, 
pp. 211-265. 
 
5 For Figure 3, I have created a merged business productivity series that splices the SIC and 
NAICS data.   7
economy and the business sector, productivity growth has returned to their 
trends during the 1948-73 period. 
 
  Three points about these results can be seen from the tables and figures. 
First, the different sources are very consistent for GDP, but somewhat less 
consistent for business output. The difficulties in estimating business 
productivity are likely to reside in attempting to match the BEA-BLS 
(expenditure) concept of business output with income-side data from the 
industry accounts. Business output under the NAICS concept is substantially 
lower that for the BLS concept: 2.82 percent per year in the former as compared 
to 3.37 percent per year for the latter during the 1998-2003 period. It should be 
emphasized, however, that the productivity data are not necessarily 
inaccurate, because the output and hours data are matched by industry.  
 
   Second, business output productivity is between one-quarter and one-
half percentage points higher than GDP productivity depending upon the time 
period and concept.  
 
  Third, as can be best seen in the graphs, for both total GDP and for 
business output, productivity growth since 1995 has rebounded very sharply. 
For the last two years, productivity has returned to the peak years in the 1948-
73 period. Moreover, while the detailed industry classification system changed 
greatly from the SIC to the NAICS system, the two systems appear to 
aggregate to similar numbers for total GDP.  
  B. Rebound by Industry 
 
1.  Results for broad industry groups, 1998-2003 
 
  We next examine the sources of the rebound by industry. For broad 
industry groups (non-durable manufacturing, construction, information, etc.), 
BEA publishes both hours worked as well as real and nominal value added 
and prices by industry. In addition, we have separated out Computers and 
electronic products from Durable manufacturing because of the importance of 
computers in the overall productivity numbers.6 Using these data, we can use 
equation (1) above to determine the sources of the productivity rebound over 
this period. 
 
  Table 3 shows productivity growth by major industry group, while Table 
4 shows the contribution of each major industry to the overall productivity 
growth. For this period, Computers and electronic products continued to show 
very rapid productivity growth, averaging a torrid 26 percent per year. 
Information industries and Retail trade also showed very rapid growth.  
 
  In estimating the contribution of each of the industries to the total shown 
in Table 4, we use the fixed-weight productivity growth ( ), using average 
shares for the period 1998-2003. Over this period, weighted productivity 
growth for the entire economy was 2.49 percent per year, which was, not 
F
t  a
                                              
6 Computers were separated out by constructing a Törnqvist index of output growth of durable 
manufacturing output and computer output growth for 1998-2003. It was assumed that hours 
worked per person engaged in the computer subsector is equal to that for all of durable 
manufacturing. While the Törnqvist index gives slightly different results from Fisher 
aggregation, the difference is extremely small. 
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surprisingly, entirely driven by private industries. However, the source of the 
rapid growth is a surprise. The largest source was Finance, insurance, real 
estate, and related industries, contributing 0.72 percentage points or 29 percent 
of the total weighted productivity growth. Computers and electronic products 
contributed 0.43 percentage points, or 17 percent of the total. Other important 
major industries were Retail trade, Information, and Professional services. 
Other services, Government, and Construction continued to show essentially 
no productivity growth and contributed nothing, at least as measured in the 
national accounts. 
 
1.  Results for detailed industries, 1998-2003 
 
  We next drill a little deeper to determine which detailed industry showed 
the major contribution to the productivity rebound. The data for detailed 
industries cover only persons engaged rather than hours worked. Productivity 
per person rises more slowly than productivity per hour, but the major trends 
are likely to be accurately captured in these estimates.7 
  Table A-1 in the appendix shows the growth in productivity per person 
engaged for all industries, while Table 5 shows the results for the top 15 
industries. There is no major surprise in the rapid growth in Computers. 
However, the performance of Securities, commodity, and investments; 
Information and data processing services; and Apparel and leather and allied 
products may be more of a surprise. We return below to further tests of these 
data. 
                                              
7 An additional complication is that hours worked exclude the hours of self-employed workers. Table A-3 
in the Appendix shows a calculation of the potential bias from excluding self-employed hours, using BEA 
data. The bias in the overall productivity numbers are in the order of plus or minus 0.05 percentage point 
per year. Agricultural productivity is likely to have a downward bias of abound 1 percentage point per 
year. There may also be a small upward bias in the estimated hours worked in Information, Professional 
services, and Other services, but the bias is unlikely to be larger than 0.2 percentage points per year in 
any non-agricultural sector.   10
 
  The next question is how much each industry contributed to the overall 
productivity growth in the 1998-2003 period. Table A-2 in the appendix shows 
the contribution of individual industries to the aggregate fixed-weighted 
productivity growth in productivity per person engaged, while Table 6 shows 
the results for the top 15 industries. Of the 208 basis point per year average 
productivity growth, 40 basis points came from Computers and electronic 
products and 46 basis points came from Retail and Wholesale Trade. 
 
  3. The New Economy 
 
  We next examine the extent to which the New Economy sectors were 
responsible for the rapid productivity growth in the 1998-2003 period using 
the output per person measure. The measure of contribution here includes 
only the direct measure from production of new-economy goods; it excludes 
any contribution of new-economy capital services in using industries. Table 7 
shows the major new economy sectors (which is an overly generous bundle 
but is at the most disaggregated level available).8 These sectors enjoyed a rapid 
rate of productivity growth: 10.1 percent per year over the 1998-2003 period. 
All six new economy sectors were responsible for 76 basis points of the 208 
basis point growth rate in employment productivity, or 36 percent of the total. 
This estimate compares with an estimate in my earlier study, using the same 
methodology but different industrial definitions, in which the New Economy 
contributed 64 basis points of the 224 basis point growth in hourly 
productivity, representing 29 percent of productivity growth in the 1995-2000 
                                              
8 Inclusion of extraneous industries will inflate the nominal share in GDP of New Economy 
industries but will inflate their contribution to total productivity only slightly.  
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period.9 The difference is not large but probably lies mainly in the aggregate 
productivity rather than the impact of the New Economy industries because 
overall employment productivity grew at 40 basis points more slowly over the 
1998-2003 period than hours productivity. 
 
  4. Test of the Coherence of the Data 
 
  The industrial productivity data are a black box to outside researchers, 
and it is not easy to validate them with alternative data. One way of testing 
their plausibility is to examine the productivity identity to see whether the 
productivity growth is associated with price changes, employment changes, 
compensation, or share changes. Begin with the definition of labor’s share of 
value added: 
 
    Zi,t = 
 
 Wi,t Ei,t / X i,t P i,t  
where Z is the share of labor in value added, W is real compensation per 
person engaged, E is persons engaged, X is real output, and P is the value-
added price index relative to the GDP price index. Taking logarithmic changes 
over the 1998-2003 period and designating the lower case letters as the annual 
average logarithmic change yields productivity growth per person (ai,t) as: 
 
(2)    ai,t  =  x i,t  - ei,t  =  wi,t  - pi,t  - zi,t 
 
  We would normally expect that the shares of labor would be relatively 
stable and that wage-rate growth would not differ greatly by industry, in 
which case the productivity growth would be reflected in a price decline. A 
                                              
9 William D. Nordhaus, “Productivity Growth and the New Economy,” Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity, 2001: 2, pp. 211-265.   12
cross-sectional regression of price change on productivity change indicates 
that the coefficient is -1.002 with a standard error of the coefficient of 0.086. 
Table 8 shows the decomposition for the industries with the five highest and 
five lowest productivity growth over the 1998-2003 period. Computers and 
Securities show price changes that are parallel to the productivity increase. 
Given that the price decline in computers is well established, we can take these 
results as plausible.  
 
  The next industry on the list is “Securities, commodity contracts, related.” 
The price decline here is extremely rapid: the relative price index for value 
added in this industry (NAICS 523) declined 15 percent per year over the 1998-
2003 period. Discussions with BEA staff indicate that output for this industry 
through 2000 was based on a quantity index measuring public orders for 
equities traded on registered exchanges and over-the-counter markets; after 
2000, the quantity index was created by deflating nominal output with a new 
producer price index for financial services. 
 
  Are the underlying price indexes for Securities plausible? Have they been 
extrapolated appropriately to the entire industry? Some skepticism seems 
warranted. BEA has only recently attempted to measure real output in the 
financial-service industries. The price and quantity indexes just discussed do 
not seem representative of the entire industry, and the rapid measured 
productivity growth may be largely an artifact of rapidly falling commission 
rates during this period. However, the calculations are largely a mystery to 
this outsider. Hence, a question mark remains over this result; given that the 
Securities industry contributed 26 basis points to the overall productivity 
growth during the rebound period, validation of this number would seem to 
be a high priority.   13
 
  The rest of the top and bottom industries in Table 8 are puzzling because 
prices do not generally move with productivity. Many are poorly measured, 
particularly in the bottom five. For example, Oil and Petroleum industry value 
added real output has proved to be highly unreliable in the industry data. 
Overall, the data are reasonably coherent in most well-measured industries. 
 
III. Is Productivity Growth Good for Employment? 
 
  One of the major debates in recent years has been the role of productivity 
in employment. Some have argued that the rapid growth of productivity, 
particularly in manufacturing, has hurt workers in those industries by leading 
producers to shed jobs. Critics of this point of view generally argue that, while 
this might be true for a particular firm or industry, or might hold in the short 
run, in the longer run the level of jobs and unemployment will be determined 
by macroeconomic policies rather than by productivity growth. 
 
  While technological change is unlikely to have a major impact on 
aggregate unemployment or employment in the long run, this point most 
definitely does not apply to individual industries. The employment of workers 
in the typewriter industry was most definitely affected by technological trends 
there and in computers. At the microeconomic level, the impact of 
productivity growth on employment is ambiguous and depends upon the bias 
of technological change, on prices of competing goods and services, and on the 
price-elasticity of demand.  
 
  To explore this relationship, I sketch a simplified model. Assume demand 
is given by:   
(3)         Y ) /P (P   B   X   t
-
t i, t i, i t i,
i i C µ λ =
 
where  is output,  is own price,  is the price of competing goods,  is 
real income, and -λi and µi are price and income elasticities. Further, assume 
that production is given by 
t i, X   t i,  P
C
t i,  P t Y
 
(4)           
i i α α − =
1
t i, t i, t i, t i, L   K   A   X  
 
where  is total factor productivity,  is capital inputs,  is labor inputs, 
and
t i, A   t i, K   t i, L  
i  α  is the Cobb-Douglas elasticity. For this discussion, we further assume 
either that production is Cobb-Douglas or that technological change is Hicks-
neutral.  
 
  The basic argument is straightforward. The average and marginal costs of 
production are   where is the wage rate,  is the cost of 
capital, and we have normalized for any inessential constants. If each firm 
behaves competitively, profit-maximizing price is . This 
implies that price declines proportionally with productivity. Let  be the 
logarithmic increase in ; then, with other variables unchanged, the increase 
in output is 
) 1 ( 1 i i α α − − − −
t i, t i, t i, W    R A   t i, W   t i,  R
) 1 ( 1 i i α α − − − − = t i, t i, t i, t i, W    R A      P
t i, a  ∆
t i, A  
t i, i a   ∆ λ , and inputs increase by  t i, i a (   ∆ − ) 1 λ . With Hicks-neutral 
technological change, both employment and capital inputs increase 
by t i, i a (   ∆ − ) 1 λ .10 
                                              
10  The story would be different if technological change is not neutral and production is not Cobb-
Douglas, but in either of these cases employment  (or more generally labor inputs) will be positively 
related to technological change if the demand for output is price-elastic (λ > 1). If the market structure is 
non-competitive or if there are non-constant-returns to scale, then foreign prices and output effects will 
enter as well. 
  14 
 Note  that  the  trend levels of production and employment will depend not 
only on domestic productivity but also on competing prices, incomes, and 
elasticities. Since  , the growth in production and employment will 
be given by: 
t i, t i, a p ∆ − = ∆
     
(5)       y   p     a   b    x t i t i, i t i, i i t i, ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + = ∆ µ λ λ
C
(6)       y   p     a (   b    t i t i, i t i, i i t i, ∆ + ∆ + ∆ − + = ∆ µ λ λ
C e ) 1
 
where again the lower case letters in (5) and (6) are logarithms of the upper 
case letters in (3) and (4), and ∆ represents time differences.  
 
  The partial relationship of changes in employment with changes in 
productivity is seen to be  1 / − = ∆ ∂ ∆ ∂ i t i, t i,     a λ e , as described above. However, the 
trend or total effect would need to include income effects and the prices of 
competing goods. In industries like agriculture, with rapid technological 
change and inelastic price and income effects, both employment and the 
industry share of nominal output are likely to decline over time. In 
manufacturing, with price-elastic demand, the positive effect of technological 
change may be offset for employment if the prices of competing goods are 
falling rapidly. The paradoxical case, with rapid productivity growth and 
falling employment, appears to hold for the United States, while the opposite 
case, with manufacturing employment growing because domestic costs and 
prices are falling rapidly, would hold most notably for China. 
 
  There are many potential empirical approaches to determining the 
historical effect of productivity growth on employment, but for this purpose, 
  15we will use the BEA industry data discussed above. The estimated relationship 
between employment growth ( ) and productivity growth   
( ) is:  
t i, e ∆
t i, t i, t i, e x a ∆ − ∆ = ∆
 
(7)            t i, t i, i t i,     a      ε γ β ι + ∆ + = ∆e  
 
where  i β  and  ι γ  are parameters, and  t i, ε  is a residual. The residual includes 
not only random effects and measurement errors but also the impact of 
omitted variables, such as income effects and the prices of competing goods 
(such as imports or competing exports). An important assumption is that 
movements in these omitted variables are independent of short-run 
movements in productivity. The main concern about this specification is that 
errors in measuring output will lead to biased estimates of  ι γ  ; indeed, they are 
likely to lead to a downward bias in the estimates of  ι γ . 
 
  Table 9 shows estimates for eight different specifications. These differ first 
by time period (one being 1955-2001 for the earlier BEA data set and the other 
being 1998-2003 for the new BEA data set); a second alternative is with current 
or current and lagged productivity growth; and a third is with least squares or 
two-stage least squares, with instruments being the current and lagged rate of 
change of prices as an instrument for productivity growth (because prices and 
productivity are independently measured for most manufacturing industries). 
In each case, the industries are the 21 or 19 manufacturing industries in the old 
and new data set, respectively. 
 
  The results for manufacturing are relatively sharp in both data sets. In the 
old data set, the impact of productivity growth on employment is uniformly 
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positive, and significantly so in two of the four estimates. The coefficients 
(partial elasticities) are between 0.05 and 0.10, indicating that a 10 percent 
increase in productivity growth above trend would lead to a ½ to 1 percent 
increase in employment.  
 
  For the new and shorter data set, all current coefficients are significant, 
and three are significant at the 1 percent level. In addition, there is a 
suggestion of a significant lagged effect. In the new data set, the TSLS 
estimates provide higher coefficients, indicating that there may be a 
downward bias in the OLS results due to measurement error in output. 
Overall, the estimates in the more recent data indicate that the elasticity of 
employment with respect to productivity is at least ¼ and might be as high as 
½. Finally, the coefficients are much larger in the new data set, which suggests 
that demand is more elastic in the later period because the U.S. economy is 
more open to international trade. 
 
  The empirical results presented here sharply reject the view that higher 
growth in manufacturing productivity leads to a decline in employment. How 
are these findings consistent with the rapid growth in manufacturing 
productivity and the decline in manufacturing employment? The answer lies 
in the determinants of trend output and employment shown in equations (5) 
and (6). It is likely that productivity and costs in other countries, such as 
China, have been declining even more rapidly than in the United States. This is 
obvious in some industries, such as consumer electronics or apparel, where 
China simply did not compete two decades ago and Chinese prices were from 
an economic point of view essentially infinite. 
   18
  The tentative conclusion here is suggestive of the views of the labor leader 
John L. Lewis of the United Mine Workers. His philosophy was that 
productivity advances in that industry should lead to increased production 
and employment and that the union should not resist modern techniques. 
Given the elasticities, Lewis may have been wrong about coal, but he was 




  The late 1990s and early 2000s have seen a rapid growth in productivity in 
the American economy. A close examination of the rebound finds that rapid 
growth is centered in the New Economy but is much more widespread than 
simply computers and semiconductors.  
 
  This study also asks whether workers should be fearful of rapid 
productivity growth in light of the decline in non-farm employment. The 
results here suggest that productivity is not to be feared – at least not in 
manufacturing, where the largest employment declines have occurred. On the 
whole, higher productivity has led to lower prices, expanding demand, and 
quickly to higher employment, but the partial effects of rapid domestic 
productivity growth have been more than offset by more rapid productivity 






































Figure 1. Comparison of growth in GDP per hour, 
alternative output sources 
 
This figure shows productivity growth according to three measures: 
“GDP: SIC” = GDP per hour constructed by author by aggregating from earlier 
industry data (i.e., from 1972/1987 SIC industrial classification) 
“GDP: NAICS” = GDP per hour aggregated by author from latest industry data (i.e., 
from NAICS industrial classification) 
“GDP: NIPA” = output per hour from real GDP in the NIPA accounts 
 
 












Figure 2. Comparison of growth in business output per hour, 
alternative output sources 
 
This figure shows productivity growth according to three measures: 
“Bus: SIC” = Output per hour in business sector constructed by author by 
aggregating from earlier industry data (i.e., from 1972/1987 SIC industrial 
classification) 
“Bus: NAICS” = GDP per hour in business sector aggregated by author from latest 
industry data (i.e., from NAICS industrial classification) 
“Bus: NIPA” = output per hour for business output from BLS 






















































Figure 3. Productivity Growth in Four Epochs, Different Concepts 
For industry definitions, see Figures 1 and 2 
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Growth in output per hour, GDP
Average annual logarithmic growth, percent per year
1949-1959 1959-1973 1973-95 1995-2001 1998-2003
Industry accounts
SIC 2.34% 2.10% 1.24% 1.94%
NAICS 2.47%
NIPA
2.39% 2.08% 1.32% 1.86% 2.53%
 
 
Table 1. Average productivity growth for GDP by concept and period 





Growth in output per hour, business output
Average annual logarithmic growth, percent per year
1949-1959 1959-1973 1973-95 1995-2001 1998-2003
Industry accounts
SIC 2.76% 2.42% 1.38% 2.50%
NAICS 2.82%
BLS
3.18% 3.03% 1.47% 2.61% 3.37%
 
 
Table 2. Average productivity growth for business output 
by concept and period 
For industry definitions, see Figure 2
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  Annual logarithmic productivity growth (% per year)
Sector 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Average
Gross domestic product 2.07 2.05 1.71 2.90 3.72 2.49
Private industries 2.24 2.38 2.28 3.39 3.92 2.84
Agriculture, forestry, related -0.18 9.76 -12.06 5.88 9.18 2.52
Mining 11.89 -3.90 -8.62 7.53 -6.75 0.03
Utilities 3.45 8.82 -3.04 8.94 8.43 5.32
Construction -4.11 -2.96 0.58 -0.67 -0.02 -1.44
Durable goods other than computers 0.21 4.49 0.09 7.24 3.77 3.16
Computer and electronic products 28.17 38.59 5.63 22.42 35.13 25.99
Nondurable goods 2.12 0.73 -0.05 8.96 6.86 3.72
Wholesale trade 5.09 -3.16 8.56 4.46 -1.16 2.76
Retail trade 1.66 4.44 6.48 5.38 6.22 4.84
Transportation and warehousing 1.91 4.88 0.58 5.21 6.35 3.79
Information 4.84 3.11 4.46 7.45 12.14 6.40
Finance, insurance, real estate, related 3.05 6.91 4.67 1.67 1.94 3.65
Professional and business services 1.17 -1.57 3.52 3.67 4.07 2.17
Educational services, health care, related -0.18 0.17 -0.69 0.17 0.40 -0.03
Arts, entertainment, recreation, related 0.88 -0.07 -0.83 0.62 1.34 0.39
Other services, except government -2.96 -1.89 -2.84 -3.33 1.46 -1.91
Government 0.52 0.32 -0.58 -0.35 1.14 0.21  
 
Table 3. Productivity growth per hour, 1998-2003, by broad industry group 




Contribution to aggregate productivity growth
1998-2002 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Average
Gross domestic product 100.00 2.07 2.05 1.71 2.90 3.72 2.49
Private industries 87.50 1.96 2.08 2.00 2.97 3.43 2.49
Finance, insurance, real estate, etc. 19.74 0.60 1.36 0.92 0.33 0.38 0.72
Computer and electronic products 1.66 0.47 0.64 0.09 0.37 0.58 0.43
Retail trade 6.91 0.12 0.31 0.45 0.37 0.43 0.33
Information 4.62 0.22 0.14 0.21 0.34 0.56 0.30
Professional and business services 11.53 0.13 -0.18 0.41 0.42 0.47 0.25
Durable goods other than computers 6.78 0.01 0.30 0.01 0.49 0.26 0.21
Wholesale trade 6.08 0.31 -0.19 0.52 0.27 -0.07 0.17
Nondurable goods 5.75 0.12 0.04 0.00 0.51 0.39 0.21
Transportation and warehousing 3.01 0.06 0.15 0.02 0.16 0.19 0.11
Utilities 1.97 0.07 0.17 -0.06 0.18 0.17 0.10
Arts, entertainment, recreation, etc. 3.54 0.03 0.00 -0.03 0.02 0.05 0.01
Agriculture, forestry, etc. 1.03 0.00 0.10 -0.12 0.06 0.09 0.03
Government 12.44 0.06 0.04 -0.07 -0.04 0.14 0.03
Mining 1.04 0.12 -0.04 -0.09 0.08 -0.07 0.00
Educational services, health care, etc. 7.09 -0.01 0.01 -0.05 0.01 0.03 0.00
Other services, except government 2.40 -0.07 -0.05 -0.07 -0.08 0.04 -0.05
Construction 4.42 -0.18 -0.13 0.03 -0.03 0.00 -0.06  
 
Table 4. Contribution of different industries to productivity rebound, 1998-
2003,  by broad industry group 
  24Sector       Productivity Growth per Person Engaged
[percent per year]
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Average, 
1998-2003
Gross domestic product 2.33 1.56 0.50 2.92 3.10 2.08
Private industries 2.58 1.76 0.91 3.40 3.28 2.39
Computer and electronic products 28.93 37.69 2.91 22.53 35.09 25.43
Securities, commodity contracts, and investments 16.42 33.28 10.65 4.87 18.00 16.64
Information and data processing services 12.79 -2.24 13.06 16.11 13.21 10.58
Apparel and leather and allied products 0.95 12.30 -0.31 24.72 14.47 10.43
Air transportation 4.50 4.72 -0.29 16.06 24.93 9.99
Publishing industries (includes software) 16.75 -5.68 5.89 4.03 11.46 6.49
Electrical equipment, appliances, and components 9.89 2.41 0.00 7.52 12.57 6.48
Computer systems design and related services 5.78 5.07 4.33 9.83 6.79 6.36
Motor vehicles, bodies and trailers, and parts 0.95 3.47 -5.35 18.92 11.05 5.81
Broadcasting and telecommunications 8.56 2.18 -4.16 6.05 12.05 4.94
Warehousing and storage 3.89 4.41 -5.03 10.84 8.94 4.61
Chemical products 4.68 -0.13 -0.06 10.19 8.37 4.61
Textile mills and textile product mills 4.29 9.27 -9.21 8.31 10.14 4.56
Miscellaneous manufacturing 3.26 9.72 -2.35 5.61 5.56 4.36
Pipeline transportation 8.49 14.18 -4.45 3.03 0.49 4.35
 
 
Table 5. Growth in Productivity per person engaged: 
top 15 of detailed industry groups, 1998-2003 
  25Sector     Contribution to Total Productivity Growth
[percent per year]
 1 9 9 92 0 0 02 0 0 12 0 0 22 0 0 3
Average, 
1998-2003
Gross domestic product 2.33 1.56 0.50 2.92 3.10 2.08
Private industries 2.58 1.76 0.91 3.40 3.28 2.09
Computer and electronic products 0.53 0.69 0.05 0.29 0.45 0.40
Retail trade 0.19 0.14 0.21 0.45 0.41 0.28
Securities, commodity contracts, and related 0.25 0.54 0.18 0.08 0.27 0.26
Wholesale trade 0.21 -0.10 0.68 0.23 -0.14 0.18
Rental and leasing services and related 0.11 0.18 0.07 0.20 0.09 0.13
Broadcasting and telecommunications 0.23 0.06 -0.12 0.16 0.31 0.13
Federal Reserve banks and related 0.19 -0.04 0.13 0.20 0.07 0.11
Utilities 0.09 0.12 -0.11 0.14 0.18 0.08
Computer systems design and related 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.12 0.08 0.08
Chemical products 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.14 0.07
Publishing industries (includes software) 0.20 -0.07 0.07 0.05 0.13 0.07
Motor vehicles and related 0.01 0.04 -0.06 0.20 0.12 0.06
Air transportation 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.08 0.12 0.05
Information and data processing services 0.05 -0.01 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.04
Electrical equipment, appliances, and rel;ated 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.03
 
 
Table 6. Contribution of top 15 industries to aggregate productivity growth 
for detailed industries, 1998-2003 
  26 
Sector     Contribution to Total Productivity Growth
[percent per year]
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Average, 
1998-2003
Gross domestic product 2.33 1.56 0.50 2.92 3.10 2.08
New economy industries 1.12 0.74 0.11 0.72 1.08 0.76
Computer and electronic products 0.53 0.69 0.05 0.29 0.45 0.40
Broadcasting and telecommunications 0.23 0.06 -0.12 0.16 0.31 0.13
Computer systems design and related services 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.12 0.08 0.08
Publishing industries (includes software) 0.20 -0.07 0.07 0.05 0.13 0.07
Information and data processing services 0.05 -0.01 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.04
Electrical equipment, appliances, and related 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.03
 
 




Average annual growth in variable (logarithmic, percent per year)
Sector
Labor 











Computer and electronic products 25.4% -23.3% 19.2% 6.9% -6.3% 3.0%
Securities, commodity contracts, related 16.6% -14.6% 17.2% 4.6% 0.6% 0.7%
Information and data processing services 10.6% -0.8% 8.7% 7.8% -1.9% -3.8%
Apparel and leather and allied products 10.4% -2.1% -0.7% 4.6% -11.1% -5.6%
Air transportation 10.0% -8.7% 8.3% 4.2% -1.7% 1.0%
Bottom 5
Petroleum and coal products -2.4% 7.7% -5.2% 11.8% -2.8% 4.6%
Other services, except government -2.5% 3.3% -0.8% 3.5% 1.7% 0.9%
Water transportation -2.6% 3.4% -1.9% 3.8% 0.8% 1.1%
Educational services -2.8% 4.2% 0.6% 4.3% 3.3% 1.0%
Oil and gas extraction -5.3% 21.9% -6.6% 5.0% -1.3% -13.5%
   (a) Price and real compensation are industry price and compensation per worker 
         less growth in price of domestic output.  
 




  27Dependent Period   Independent variables





technique    (productivity growth)
1  1955-2001 Pooled  LS 0.05 **
0.02
2  1955-2001 Pooled  LS 0.06 ** 0.04
0.02 0.02
3  1955-2001 Pooled 0.05
TSLS 0.03
4  1955-2001 Pooled 0.05 0.00
TSLS 0.03 0.04
5 1998-2003 Pooled LS 0.10 *
0.04
6 1998-2003 Pooled LS 0.13 ** 0.11 *
0.05 0.05
7 1998-2003 Pooled 0.33 **
TSLS 0.10
8 1998-2003 Pooled 0.40 ** 0.17
TSLS 0.11 0.09
Note on statistics: The first number is the coefficient estimate, and the second
is the standard error of the coefficient.
* Significant at the 5 percent level.
** Significant at the 1 percent level.
All equations are estimated as first differences of the logarithm with
fixed effects for industries and years.  
 
Table 9. Regression Coefficients Showing Effect of Productivity Growth on 
Employment Growth, For Manufacturing Industries, Various Periods 
 
Estimated equation is (7) from text,  t i, t i, i t i,     a      ε γ β ι + ∆ + = ∆e , where  is the 
annual growth in persons engaged, and 
t i, e ∆
t i, a ∆ is the annual growth in output per 
person. The coefficients in the table are estimates of  ι γ .
  28Sector       Productivity Growth per Person Engaged
[percent per year]
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Average, 
1998-2003
Gross domestic product 2.33 1.56 0.50 2.92 3.10 2.08
Private industries 2.58 1.76 0.91 3.40 3.28 2.39
Farms 3.38 12.10 -13.94 3.96 10.89 3.28
Forestry, fishing, and related activities 1.71 6.87 -12.60 10.21 7.38 2.72
Oil and gas extraction 13.26 -16.50 -9.81 2.30 -15.66 -5.28
Mining, except oil and gas 12.85 5.05 -4.68 0.26 7.70 4.24
Support activities for mining 6.81 15.98 -26.35 5.39 14.46 3.26
Utilities 4.19 6.15 -5.38 7.16 8.87 4.20
Construction -2.56 -2.81 1.41 -0.45 -1.44 -1.17
Wood products -1.59 5.08 1.94 0.24 4.83 2.10
Nonmetallic mineral products 1.45 -0.43 0.36 -0.49 5.82 1.34
Primary metals 7.34 -0.20 -2.67 12.68 3.26 4.08
Fabricated metal products 0.36 5.26 -5.19 4.80 7.35 2.51
Machinery -4.89 4.88 -3.05 4.43 5.39 1.35
Computer and electronic products 28.93 37.69 2.91 22.53 35.09 25.43
Electrical equipment, appliances, and components 9.89 2.41 0.00 7.52 12.57 6.48
Motor vehicles, bodies and trailers, and parts 0.95 3.47 -5.35 18.92 11.05 5.81
Other transportation equipment 1.61 -0.14 3.81 6.13 -2.89 1.70
Furniture and related products 1.19 2.80 -8.55 3.59 0.71 -0.05
Miscellaneous manufacturing 3.26 9.72 -2.35 5.61 5.56 4.36
Food and beverage and tobacco products 0.69 -0.33 0.37 -0.42 2.61 0.59
Textile mills and textile product mills 4.29 9.27 -9.21 8.31 10.14 4.56
Apparel and leather and allied products 0.95 12.30 -0.31 24.72 14.47 10.43
Paper products 3.13 -7.48 -8.09 11.27 10.48 1.86
Printing and related support activities 1.56 1.94 -7.93 5.82 1.89 0.66
Petroleum and coal products -6.25 -19.47 -7.54 28.28 -6.91 -2.38
Chemical products 4.68 -0.13 -0.06 10.19 8.37 4.61
Plastics and rubber products 3.84 2.40 -1.52 8.40 7.70 4.17
Wholesale trade 3.46 -1.69 11.35 3.80 -2.35 2.91
Retail trade 2.81 2.09 3.09 6.48 5.78 4.05
Air transportation 4.50 4.72 -0.29 16.06 24.93 9.99
Rail transportation 1.57 7.81 0.60 1.84 3.32 3.03
Water transportation -9.54 8.82 -3.53 -5.73 -3.18 -2.63
Truck transportation -1.91 -0.90 -5.85 1.59 2.06 -1.00
Transit and ground passenger transportation 0.41 -1.14 -7.71 0.95 -1.15 -1.73
Pipeline transportation 8.49 14.18 -4.45 3.03 0.49 4.35
Other transportation and support activities 2.89 2.64 -5.77 6.14 2.81 1.74
Warehousing and storage 3.89 4.41 -5.03 10.84 8.94 4.61
Publishing industries (includes software) 16.75 -5.68 5.89 4.03 11.46 6.49
Motion picture and sound recording industries 6.47 0.80 0.68 -1.25 5.64 2.47
Broadcasting and telecommunications 8.56 2.18 -4.16 6.05 12.05 4.94
Information and data processing services 12.79 -2.24 13.06 16.11 13.21 10.58
Federal Reserve banks and related 5.76 -1.19 3.70 5.40 1.83 3.10
Securities, commodity contracts, and investments 16.42 33.28 10.65 4.87 18.00 16.64
Insurance carriers and related activities -2.24 6.93 -6.35 -2.36 1.61 -0.48
Funds, trusts, and other financial vehicles -23.11 -28.95 30.63 -6.09 21.24 -1.26
Real estate 2.62 2.39 -0.07 -0.57 -3.72 0.13
Rental and leasing services and related 1.83 -1.32 -1.27 1.67 1.36 0.45
Legal services -0.37 1.41 2.14 -1.71 -0.10 0.27
Computer systems design and related services 5.78 5.07 4.33 9.83 6.79 6.36
Rental and leasing services and related 2.73 4.31 1.78 4.75 2.14 3.14
Management of companies and enterprises -0.78 -2.80 -1.40 1.37 3.25 -0.07
Administrative and support services -0.59 -11.42 0.86 6.74 5.27 0.17
Waste management and remediation services 7.95 1.44 -6.68 3.23 7.53 2.69
Educational services -1.38 -0.94 -4.36 -3.64 -3.50 -2.76
Health care and social assistance -0.27 0.62 -0.51 1.26 0.96 0.41
Arts, entertainment, and recreation 1.01 -3.46 -1.39 1.79 -0.30 -0.47
Accommodation 0.11 1.35 -7.48 6.22 2.07 0.45
Food services and drinking places 0.51 1.13 4.90 -0.54 0.70 1.34
Other services, except government -3.23 -1.68 -3.19 -4.17 -0.28 -2.51
General government 0.55 -0.50 2.72 0.81 0.93 0.90
Government enterprises -0.83 6.73 -10.72 4.68 2.97 0.57
General government 0.44 0.36 -0.41 -0.53 -0.16 -0.06
Government enterprises 3.43 2.84 -7.73 -7.61 3.44 -1.13 
 
Table A-1. Productivity Growth by Detailed Industry 
  29Sector     Contribution to Total Productivity Growth
[percent per year]
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Average, 
1998-2003
Gross domestic product 2.33 1.56 0.50 2.92 3.10 2.08
Private industries 2.58 1.76 0.91 3.40 3.28 2.09
Farms 0.03 0.09 -0.10 0.03 0.08 0.02
Forestry, fishing, and related activities 0.00 0.02 -0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01
Oil and gas extraction 0.06 -0.11 -0.08 0.01 -0.10 -0.04
Mining, except oil and gas 0.04 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01
Support activities for mining 0.01 0.02 -0.04 0.01 0.02 0.00
Utilities 0.09 0.12 -0.11 0.14 0.18 0.08
Construction -0.11 -0.12 0.06 -0.02 -0.07 -0.05
Wood products -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
Nonmetallic mineral products 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01
Primary metals 0.04 0.00 -0.01 0.05 0.01 0.02
Fabricated metal products 0.00 0.07 -0.06 0.05 0.08 0.03
Machinery -0.06 0.05 -0.03 0.04 0.05 0.01
Computer and electronic products 0.53 0.69 0.05 0.29 0.45 0.40
Electrical equipment, appliances, and components 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.03
Motor vehicles, bodies and trailers, and parts 0.01 0.04 -0.06 0.20 0.12 0.06
Other transportation equipment 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.04 -0.02 0.01
Furniture and related products 0.00 0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00
Miscellaneous manufacturing 0.02 0.06 -0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02
Food and beverage and tobacco products 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.01
Textile mills and textile product mills 0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01
Apparel and leather and allied products 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.02
Paper products 0.02 -0.04 -0.04 0.05 0.05 0.01
Printing and related support activities 0.01 0.01 -0.04 0.03 0.01 0.00
Petroleum and coal products -0.02 -0.05 -0.02 0.08 -0.02 -0.01
Chemical products 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.14 0.07
Plastics and rubber products 0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.05 0.05 0.03
Wholesale trade 0.21 -0.10 0.68 0.23 -0.14 0.18
Retail trade 0.19 0.14 0.21 0.45 0.41 0.28
Air transportation 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.08 0.12 0.05
Rail transportation 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
Water transportation -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Truck transportation -0.02 -0.01 -0.05 0.01 0.02 -0.01
Transit and ground passenger transportation 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pipeline transportation 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Other transportation and support activities 0.02 0.02 -0.04 0.04 0.02 0.01
Warehousing and storage 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.03 0.01
Publishing industries (includes software) 0.20 -0.07 0.07 0.05 0.13 0.07
Motion picture and sound recording industries 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01
Broadcasting and telecommunications 0.23 0.06 -0.12 0.16 0.31 0.13
Information and data processing services 0.05 -0.01 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.04
Federal Reserve banks and related 0.19 -0.04 0.13 0.20 0.07 0.11
Securities, commodity contracts, and investments 0.25 0.54 0.18 0.08 0.27 0.26
Insurance carriers and related activities -0.05 0.17 -0.15 -0.05 0.04 -0.01
Funds, trusts, and other financial vehicles -0.03 -0.05 0.05 -0.01 0.04 0.00
Real estate 0.29 0.26 -0.01 -0.07 -0.43 0.01
Rental and leasing services and related 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00
Legal services -0.01 0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.00
Computer systems design and related services 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.12 0.08 0.08
Rental and leasing services and related 0.11 0.18 0.07 0.20 0.09 0.13
Management of companies and enterprises -0.01 -0.05 -0.03 0.02 0.06 0.00
Administrative and support services -0.02 -0.31 0.02 0.18 0.14 0.00
Waste management and remediation services 0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01
Educational services -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02
Health care and social assistance -0.02 0.04 -0.03 0.08 0.07 0.03
Arts, entertainment, and recreation 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00
Accommodation 0.00 0.01 -0.07 0.05 0.02 0.00
Food services and drinking places 0.01 0.02 0.09 -0.01 0.01 0.02
Other services, except government -0.08 -0.04 -0.08 -0.10 -0.01 -0.06
General government 0.02 -0.02 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.03
Government enterprises -0.01 0.04 -0.07 0.03 0.02 0.00
General government 0.03 0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01
Government enterprises 0.03 0.02 -0.05 -0.05 0.02 -0.01 
Table A-2. Contribution to Aggregate Productivity Growth by Detailed 
Industry 
  30Sector
Hours of Self 
Employed as 
Percent of Total 
Hours, 2000-2003
Average Change 




in Hours of Self 
Employed, 2000-
2003
Domestic industries 4.4% -0.06% 0.05%
  Private industries 0.5% 0.00%
    Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting 35.8% -0.97% -1.03%
      Farms 53.4% -0.65% 0.33%
      Forestry, fishing, and related activities 9.2% -0.58% -1.17%
    Mining 1.1% -0.03% -0.01%
    Utilities 0.0% -0.01% 0.00%
    Construction 12.1% -0.18% 0.08%
    Manufacturing 1.1% 0.00% 0.07%
      Durable goods 1.1% 0.00% 0.06%
      Nondurable goods 1.1% 0.00% 0.08%
    Wholesale trade 2.1% -0.05% 0.07%
    Retail trade 4.4% -0.13% 0.03%
    Transportation and warehousing 4.8% 0.16%
    Information 2.2% 0.21%
    Finance and insurance, real estate, other 5.2% 0.01% 0.00%
Services -0.18%
    Professional and business services 6.6% 0.14%
    Educational services, health care, other 4.2% -0.10%
    Arts, entertainment, recreation, other 3.8% 0.02%
    Other services, except government 10.3% 0.17%
  Government 0.0% 0.00%
    General government 0.0% 0.00%
    Government enterprises 0.0% 0.00%
Notes: Data from BEA web page. Data for 1987-2000 use SIC classification, while 2000-2003 use NAICS classification.
The industry definitions are consistent within each column but differ slightly between the two sub-periods. For each
estimate, I assume that self-employed workers work 1000 hours per year.  
 
 
Table A-3. Change in share of hours of self-employed workers 
 
  31